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Abstract
This paper estimates the effect of capital taxation on portfolio composition and savings using quasi-
experimental variation generated by the Dutch 2001 capital tax reform. The reform drove a wedge
between the taxation of housing and financial wealth and in addition affected the after-tax return
on all assets. I use unique administrative household panel data with information on capital income,
wealth and portfolio shares to exploit this variation. I derive and estimate a semi-structural model
which directly relates the share invested in financial wealth to the after-tax return on financial and
housing wealth. In addition, I link accumulated wealth in the reform-period to the change in the
after-tax return on total wealth. Elasticities have the expected sign but are modest in size. I find
some evidence for heterogeneity in the behavioral response. In particular, rich and single households
seem to be more responsive in terms of both portfolio composition and wealth accumulation, than
other households. The estimated elasticities can be used in capital tax models to calibrate the opti-
mal tax rate.
Keywords: Tax Reform, Capital Taxation of Households, Portfolio Composition, Intertemporal Be-
havior
JEL-codes: H24, H31, G11, G18
1 Introduction
Capital taxation is a contentious issue in public economics. Seminal papers by Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976), Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) suggest capital should not be taxed at all. However, recent
literature suggests that this result only holds in a very specific setting and the optimal tax rate on capital
tax is generally non-zero (see for an overview Conesa et al., 2009 and Diamond and Banks, 2010). In
addition, many governments create tax incentives for households to hold specific assets, such as owner
occupied housing and pension savings, but very little is known about the effectiveness of these subsidies.
In order to calculate the optimal capital tax rate on each asset it is of central concern to know if,
and by how much, households respond to tax incentives when they choose their portfolio composition,
and their level of savings. In this paper I answer this question by exploiting variation of the Dutch 2001
capital income tax reform.1
The reform was announced in 2000 and created enormous quasi-experimental variation in the after-
tax return on assets. In particular, the reform drove a wedge between the taxation of owner-occupied
housing, hereafter referred to as housing wealth, and the taxation of all other assets in household’s
portfolio, hereafter referred to as financial wealth.
Most households in the Netherlands owning both types of wealth have received a shock to their after-
tax return on each of the two wealth types. At the household level, the two shocks are uncorrelated. In
addition, the shock provides variation at each level of household income and all levels of (positive) wealth.
∗The author would like to thank Eva Gavrilova, Aart Gerritsen, Bas Jacobs, Henrik Kleven, Sander Renes, Marcel
Smeets and Hendrik Vrijburg for useful suggestions and comments. Furthermore, the author would like to thank Statistics
Netherlands for providing the data for this paper. All remaining errors are my own. The Stata programs used for the
computations in this paper are available from the author on request.
†Norwegian School of Economics. E-mail: floris.zoutman@nhh.no
1See Bovenberg and Cnossen (2001) for a comprehensive overview of the tax reform.
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This allows me to isolate the effect of the tax reform from other changes in the dependent variable that
are correlated with income, wealth and many other control variables.
In order to estimate the effect of the reform, I use a specifically designed unique panel dataset
provided by Statistics Netherlands over the period 1995-2004. The dataset is based on the Income Panel
Investigation (IPO) which keeps track of administrative records of 0.61 percent of the Dutch population,
as well as their household members. The original IPO contains individual tax records on capital and
labor income collected from both employers and employees for each household member, as well as a large
set of control variables collected at both the national and the municipal level. For the purpose of this
study the dataset is extended at the household level with administrative data on household portfolios.
The use of this data is one of the main innovations in this paper. In his Presidential Address
to the members of the American Finance Association Campbell (2006) points out that to estimate a
portfolio choice model the ideal dataset should have the following five characteristics: i.) it should cover
a representative sample of the population, ii.) it should contain wealth and break down wealth into
categories, iii.) the categories should be sufficiently disaggregated, iv.) the reported data should be
sufficiently accurate and v.) households should be followed over time. The IPO dataset exhibits all of
these characteristics, and of top of that the 2001 tax reform offers quasi-experimental variation in the
return on assets. Such data is not available in the US and Canada and, as such, most previous studies
had to rely on cross-sectional survey data.23 Therefore, unlike most other studies in the literature,
in this study I can control for unobserved household heterogeneity. This could be important, because
unobserved heterogeneity, such as earnings ability, may be strongly correlated to the marginal tax rate
of the household.
In addition, to my knowledge this is the first study to directly link portfolio choice to a tax-induced
change in the after-tax return on assets. Unlike the Netherlands, most other tax systems in the world
have some sort of capital gains tax. As a result, in other countries the capital tax affects both the
expected return and the variance of the return, making it impossible to isolate the effect of taxation
on the expected returns. Further, most other tax systems in the world tax all assets more or less
synthetically. As such, it is impossible to separately identify asset-specific tax rates. In this respect the
2001 capital tax reform is an ideal experiment, because it drives a wedge between two asset types that
were previously taxed synthetically. The estimates can therefore directly be used to predict the effect of
the tax rate on a particular asset on the demand of the asset, and as such, they may be of large value to
policy makers.
In order to aggregate the reform into economically meaningful statistics I impose some structure by
developing a semi-structural model of the household’s investment and savings decisions. In the spirit
of the consumption-based capital asset pricing model (CCAPM)4 I split the household decision in a
first stage where the household chooses his level of savings and a second stage in which the household
chooses its optimal portfolio composition. In the latter stage, I derive the optimal share invested in
financial wealth and show that it should be a function of the gross expected after-tax return on financial
and housing wealth, and the variance-covariance matrix of the returns. As such, the change in portfolio
composition over the reform is a function of the change in each of these two components. I do not observe
the after-tax return, since capital gains, and post-reform cash-returns are not recorded. In addition, I
do not observe the variance-covariance matrix of the returns. However, by taking the assumption that
the change in the expected before-tax returns and the change in the variance-covariance matrix are
uncorrelated to the change in the capital-tax rate at the household level, it is still possible to identify
the effect of a tax-induced change in the after-tax return on portfolio composition.
The validity of this assumption is discussed in detail in section 4 of this paper. However intuitively,
the Netherlands is a small open economy. Therefore, the before-tax expected returns and variances in
the capital market are unlikely to be correlated to the change in the tax rate. In addition, Domar and
Musgrave (1944) already established that capital-income taxation may decrease the variance in after-tax
returns, for given variance in the before-tax returns. However, the Dutch tax system only taxes cash
returns. Since capital gains are much more volatile than cash returns5 the impact of the Dutch capital
tax system on the variance of after-tax returns is likely negligible.
Since Hall (1978) the empirical literature on the trade-off between savings and consumption has
focused on estimating the Euler-equation. In particular, the fundamental parameter of interest since
2See e.g. Hubbard (1985), King and Leape (1998) and Poterba and Samwick, 2003 and Alan et al. (2010)
3A notable exception is the working paper Alan and Leth Petersen (2006) which uses administrative panel data around
a capital-income tax reform in Denmark in the 80’s.
4See e.g. Markowitz (1952) and Merton (1969, 1971, 1973).
5See e.g. LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981) who show that capital gains in the stock market are much more
volatile than may be expected by changes in the interest rate and dividends.
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Hansen and Singleton (1983) and Hall (1988) 6 has been the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
One of the difficulties in estimating a Euler equation is endogeneity. Proper instruments which are
correlated to the rate of return but uncorrelated to the rate of consumption growth are difficult to find.
However, the Dutch capital tax reform may provide just such an instrument. Unfortunately, the data do
not allow me to uncover the consumption of households since I do not observe all objects in the budget
constraint.7 Instead I relate the change in total wealth accumulation to the change in the gross after-tax
return on the portfolio. From this equation I retrieve the elasticity of the demand of total wealth with
respect to a change in the return on total wealth. Although, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
cannot be retrieved from this equation, the sign of this elasticity equals the sign of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution. In addition, the estimated elasticity is interesting to policy makers in its own
right, because it shows how capital taxation affects total accumulated wealth.
A particular concern in studies that use a tax-reform to identify the effect of taxation upon behavior
is the endogeneity of the tax rate. In this case, the post-reform tax on housing and financial wealth
may depend on the change in housing and financial wealth. For housing wealth this effect is likely small
because housing is taxed together with labor income and labor income is orders of magnitude larger than
housing income for most households. However, the marginal tax rate on financial wealth is crucially
dependent on whether or not financial wealth exceeds a threshold. Therefore, I use the pre-reform data
from 1995-1999 to construct a model to predict what financial wealth would have been without the
reform. New tax rules are applied to predicted wealth levels to predict what the tax rate would have
been without the reform. In the final regression I use the instrumented tax rates in order to determine
the change in the after-tax return. This instrumentation strategy is standard in the estimation of the
elasticity of taxable labor income (see e.g. Feldstein, 1995, Gruber and Saez, 2002 and Weber, 2013).
A second source of endogeneity may arise from the effect of wealth on portfolio composition. Empirical
evidence shows a strong correlation between portfolio allocation and the level of wealth (see e.g. Mankiw
and Zeldes, 1991, Poterba, 2002 and Campbell, 2006). Hence, a change in wealth may lead to a change
the optimal portfolio allocation. Since, the portfolio return depends on the the portfolio allocation the
change in wealth may indirectly affect the change in the portfolio return. However, an instrument is
readily available. I estimate the change in portfolio allocation using the change in the after-tax return on
each asset. The instrument is valid because the after-tax return on each asset is unlikely to be correlated
with the change in wealth, except through the change in the return on the entire portfolio. As a result,
the portfolio-allocation stage of the household decision process can be used to instrument for the stage
where the household chooses between savings and consumption.
In the estimations I use 1999 as a base year since decisions in 2000 may already have been affected
by announcement effects. I look at long-run effects up to 2004 and short-run effects up to 2001. In
the long-run I find that a tax-induced change in the after-tax return on financial and housing wealth
has statistically significant but modest effects on portfolio composition. The central estimate is that
a one-percent increase in the tax on financial wealth decreases the share invested in financial wealth
by only 0.033 percent. The elasticity with respect to the after-tax return on housing has the expected
negative sign, but the effect is economically negligible.
Furthermore, I find that accumulated wealth in the period 1999-2004 is positive and significantly
correlated to the change in the after-tax return on the portfolio. However, again effects are rather
modest. A 1 percent increase in a hypothetical tax that covers all wealth would decrease accumulated
wealth by only 0.036 percent. The short-run elasticities are only slightly lower than long-run elasticities.
This indicates that households respond to the change instantaneously.
In the sensitivity analysis I split the sample, and estimate the elasticity of single households and
households that had high levels of wealth. The elasticity for these groups is significantly larger. However,
this result has to be interpreted with some caution because the sample of single households is rather small
and the measurement error may be smaller for the rich households than the poor households. Therefore,
it is difficult to separate real heterogeneity in the behavioral response from possible attrition through
the measurement error.
Two potential caveats should be discussed. First, unlike other studies on the effect of taxation on
portfolio allocation, such as King and Leape (1998) and Poterba and Samwick (2003), I only study the
intensive margin of the portfolio choice. Since almost all households own at least a little bit of financial
wealth through a savings or demand deposit, I exclude all households that do not own a house. Arguably,
the fact that I have aggregated the portfolio to only two assets alleviates the severity of this omission. In
addition, the decision of buying a house is fundamentally different from other investment decisions due
6See Attanasio and Weber (2010) for an overview of the literature.
7The most important missing variable are the capital gains.
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to the fundamental indivisibility of buying a house (see also Cocco, 2005), complicating the introduction
of an extensive margin in this study.
A second caveat is the fact that I do not observe the wealth employees have in their pension fund.
Total savings of the pension funds amount to 138% of GDP in 2013 and are as such a significant portion of
total savings for Dutch employees. Unfortunately, for the studied period, pension funds did not keep any
records on payments by individual employees and as such there is no way to reconstruct pension savings
for households. However, households cannot alter their pension savings on the basis of the tax reform
because the level of contributions is set in negotiations between employers and unions. In addition, the
reform has had no impact on pension savings, since pensions were untaxed both before and after the
reform.
Most classical studies, relying on (repeated) cross-sectional survey data, find a strong effect of taxation
on portfolio composition (see e.g. Hubbard, 1985, King and Leape, 1998 and Poterba and Samwick, 2003).
However, in a recent article Alan et al. (2010) partially control for unobserved household heterogeneity by
cleverly exploiting intra-household variation in the capital income tax rate in the Canadian tax system.
They find a significant but relatively modest effect of taxation on portfolio composition.
A direct comparison between previous studies and this study is complicated by the fact that previous
studies could not directly link portfolio composition to the after-tax return on assets. However, findings
in this paper broadly correspond with the modest behavioral response found in Alan et al. (2010),
suggesting that not controlling for unobserved household heterogeneity leads to an overestimation of the
impact of taxation.
A large literature has been devoted on estimating the Euler equation using a variety of datasets
and instruments. Estimates of the intertemporal rate of substitution vary between 0.65 and 1 (see e.g.
Attanasio and Weber, 1989, Attanasio and Weber, 1993, Blundell et al., 1994, Banks et al., 1994 ,
Attanasio and Weber, 1995 and Engelhardt and Kumar, 2009). This paper adds to this literature by
estimating the effect of taxation on intertemporal choice behavior. In particular, the 2001 tax reform
provides a strong instrument for the change in the after-tax return on assets. Unfortunately, there is
no direct relationship between the elasticity of the after-tax return on wealth estimated in this paper
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. However, Attanasio and Wakefield (2010) simulate a
life-cycle model where the net-after tax return on assets in the UK is increased from 2 to 2.5 percent.
Their simulations show that such an increase in the return significantly increases accumulated wealth if
the elasticity of substitution equals one. A similar policy analysis using estimates from this study shows
only a modest affect on accumulated wealth. The large difference between the estimated effect in this
paper and the simulation tentatively suggest that the estimated elasticity of intertemporal substitution
in this study is smaller than in the base-line simulations of Attanasio and Wakefield (2010).
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section explains the 2001 tax reform in detail. In the
third section discusses the IPO data. The fourth section introduces the econometric specification. The
main results are presented in the fifth section. The sixth section presents some sensitivity analysis and
the final section concludes.
2 The 2001 Tax Reform
The 2001 tax reform was officially announced by the Dutch government in mid-2000. Rates, bracket
thresholds, income definitions and tax deductions all changed. Also, the new system introduced a wedge
between the taxation financial and housing wealth. The reform drastically changed incentives to for
portfolio composition and savings. In this section I will highlight how the tax reform has affected
incentives through the households’ intertemporal budget constraint.
In the Netherlands, household wealth has four components, each of which are taxed according to a
different tax-regime: i.) financial wealth, ii.) housing wealth, iii.) tax-deferred wealth, iv.) ownership of
small firms and closely-held corporations. Financial wealth is the difference between financial assets such
as bank accounts, stocks, bonds and real estate, and loans. Housing wealth is the difference between the
value of the owner-occupied house and the mortgage on the house.
The largest part of tax-deferred wealth are so-called second pillar pension savings. Collective labor
agreements between employers and employees require firms to set up pension funds or join in sectoral
pension funds. Total savings of the pension funds amount to 138% of GDP in 2013 and are as such a
significant portion of total savings for Dutch employees. Unfortunately, for the studied period, pension
funds did not keep any records on payments by individual employees and there is no reliable way to
4
reconstruct pension savings for households. As such, I have no choice but to ignore tax-deferred wealth
in this study. Fortunately, the 2001 reform did not affect the taxation of these assets. Furthermore,
behavioral responses in these savings at the household level are unlikely since the size of the contributions
are set in negotiations between unions and employers. Up to 2003 there were no major changes in
pension benefits, entitlements or contribution. In 2003 pension premiums did increase significantly due
to the aftermath of burst of the dot-com bubble. However, the change in pension contributions was
likely strongly correlated with household labor income and age, both of which I can control for in my
estimation, and after controlling for those factors, only weakly correlated to the change in the capital
tax rates.
In addition, this study ignores wealth stemming from small firms and closely-held corporations. The
2001 reform did change the taxation of wealth and income from closely-held corporation. However,
households that own closely-held corporations likely have the possibility to shift income between various
tax bases (see e.g. De Mooij and Nicode`me, 2008). As such, I remedy this problem by simply excluding
all households that owned close-held corporation, or small firms from my dataset. The focus of this study
is therefore on housing and financial wealth.
In the remainder of this section I will explore the changes generated by the tax reform through
the household’s intertemporal budget constraint. The linearized intertemporal budget constraint of
household i in period t is given by:
Wi,t+1 + Cit =
(
1− TLit
)
Yit + Vit +R
W
it Wit, (1)
where Wit denotes total household wealth of household i in time t, Cit consumption, Tit the marginal
tax rate on labor income of the primary earner, Yit gross labor income of the primary income earner,
and RWit the gross-return rate on total wealth after capital taxes. The actual budget constraint is non-
linear because the income is taxed progressively. However, linearizing the budget constraint simplifies
the exposition considerably and is useful in deriving the relationship between behavior and the marginal
tax rate (see also Saez, 2001, Gruber and Saez, 2002). The term Vit denotes virtual income, and contains
a correction term for the fact that the actual budget constraint is non-linear, as well as net household
income that does not pertain to labor of the primary earner.
The after-tax return on wealth is crucially dependent on the asset mix in the portfolio, since the
different categories of wealth holdings face a different tax regime. Hence, it is useful to split up total
wealth into financial and housing wealth:
Wit ≡WFit +WHit ,
where, WFit is financial wealth, the difference between financial assets and loans, and W
H
it housing wealth,
the difference between the value of the owner-occupied house and the mortgage resting on the house.
Hence, the total gross after-tax return on wealth, RWit can be subdivided in the gross after-tax return on
financial wealth and the gross after-tax return on housing wealth:
RWit = α
f
itR
F
it +
(
1− αfit
)
RHit ,
where Rjit is the after-tax return on wealth type j and α
f
it the share of financial wealth in the portfolio.
The after-tax return on each asset can be characterized by the following equation:
Rjit = 1− τ jit +
(
1− T jit
)
Rjit +R
j∗
it ∀ j ∈ {F,H} ,
where τ jit is the wealth-tax on wealth type j, R
j
it is the net taxable return on asset j and T
W j
it the
marginal tax rate over return j. Finally, Rj∗it is the untaxed return.
Before the reform the wealth tax was levied on the part of total household wealth that exceeded some
threshold. The threshold value in turn depended on household characteristics Xib.. The threshold was
larger for couples than for singles, but independent of portfolio composition:
τ jib = τib (Wib, Xib) ∀ j ∈ {F,H} ,
where the subscript b denotes the base year and Xib is the status of the household.
Cash returns were taxed synthetically with labor income of the primary earner according to a non-
linear, progressive tax-system.8 In addition, for real-estate the government taxes an imputed rent.
8The marginal tax rate I use for this study consists of two parts: general social insurance premiums and taxes. However,
I will treat both as taxes since there is no relationship between the payment of social insurance premiums and benefits.
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Capital gains were not taxed at all. Tax rates are age dependent since people over 65 do not have to
pay the social premiums relating to the general pension. As such, their effective marginal tax rates are
generally lower. In addition, there was a general tax deduction which depended on household status.
Thus, the tax function could be expressed as follows :
T jib = Tib
Yib + ∑
j∈{A,H,M}
rW
j
ib W
j
ib, Xib
 ∀ j ∈ {F,H} .
After the reform, the government introduced a tax-system based on imputed returns on financial
wealth. Financial wealth above a threshold, which was again larger for couples than singles, are presumed
to receive a return of 4 percent. The 4 percent in turn was subject to a tax rate of 30 percent. Effectively,
the presumptive capital tax is equivalent to a wealth tax of 30%×4% = 1.2%. For future reference I will
refer to this tax simply as a wealth tax. The new wealth tax does not pertain to wealth from housing.
As such, the after-reform wealth-tax on assets is given by:
τAir = τir
(
WFir , Xir
)
,
where subscript r stands for all post-reform years. Housing wealth is no longer subject to the wealth
tax:
τW
H
ir = 0.
For financial wealth the capital-income tax is abolished such that:
TW
F
ir = 0.
Capital-income pertaining from housing wealth is still taxed synthetically with labor income from the
primary earner. However, the general tax deduction is abolished and replaced with a tax credit which
depends on household type and employment status. In addition, the rates in the income tax have
changed. The post-reform income tax can therefore be expressed as:
TW
j
ir = Tir
Yir + ∑
j∈{H,M}
rW
j
ir jir, Xir
 ∀ j ∈ {H,M} ,
where Tir (.) is the post-reform income tax rate.
Table 1 gives an overview of the changes in deductions, tax credits, threshold levels and tax rates for a
single household. All amounts are expressed in 1999 euros. As can be seen, the wealth tax has increased
from 0.7 to 1.2 percent and the tax exempt threshold has been lowered drastically. This increase in
wealth taxes is offset by the fact that housing is now wealth-tax exempt. The marginal income tax rate
has decreased for households at the bottom and the top. However, the tax rate has increased for some
households that used to be in the third bracket and are now in the fourth bracket. In addition, the
income definition has changed since actual return of financial wealth is no longer taxed. However, this
is unlikely to affect the marginal tax rate much since cash returns from financial wealth are generally
much smaller than labor income for most households.
The tax-reform created a wedge between the taxation of housing wealth, and the taxation of other
financial assets, by excluding the former from the new wealth tax and the latter from the income tax.
The shock has not affected all households symmetrically. In particular, in the market for financial assets
the abolishment of the capital-income tax has stronger effects for households with high synthetic income
than for households with low synthetic income, due to tax progressivity. Additionally, because the tax
rate on capital income is dependent on the earnings of the primary income earner, the size of the shock
in the tax rate for given household income depends on the division of earnings within the household.
Specifically, for a given household income, if the incomes of primary and secondary earners are relatively
close, the tax rate on income earned by the primary earner is relatively low.9 Also, the threshold of the
wealth tax has shifted down affecting households that were previously below the threshold, but were not
after the reform. Finally, the pre-reform tax on capital-income was only levied over cash returns. As
such, households with relatively low cash returns and high capital gains paid a lower tax on their assets
9Note that this source of variation runs counter to the one exploited in Alan et al. (2010) in the Canadian tax system.
In Canada, households can choose which partner pays capital income taxes. As such, households with a more unequal
division of household income face a lower capital-income tax rate.
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Table 1: Overview of the Tax System
Pre-reform 1999 Post-reform 2001
Wealth Tax
Applies to All Wealth Financial Wealth
General Tax Deduction 89,395 16,818
Tax rate 0.70% 1.20%
Income Tax
Applies to Full Synthetic Income Labor and Housing Income
General Tax Credit 0 3,284
General Tax Deduction 3,993 0
Tax Brackets Starting Up to Percentage Starting Up to Percentage
Bracket 1 0 6,807 35.75% 0 14,209 32.35%
Bracket 2 6,807 21,861 37.05% 14,209 25,808 37.60%
Bracket 3 21,861 48,080 50% 25,808 37,408 42%
Bracket 4 48,080 ∞ 60% 37,408 ∞ 52%
Note: The table gives an overview of the pre- and post-reform wealth and income tax. Deduc-
tions and credits apply to a single household without children. Tax rates apply to all income
earners below 65. All monetary values are expressed in 1999 euros.
than households with high cash returns and low capital gains. This assymetric treatment of returns is
now abolished since the post-reform tax rate is levied independent of the division of returns within the
asset.
Furthermore, in the market for owner-occupied houseing the reform in the rates of the income tax
have increased the tax rates for some households, but decreased the tax rates for other households,
thereby providing a source of variation in the return on housing wealth. In addition, the abolishment
of the wealth-tax on housing has affected those households above the wealth-tax threshold but has not
affected those that were below the threshold.
As such, the reform offers a myriad of sources for identifying the effect of a change in the tax rate on
portfolio composition and savings. The next section will present the data used to exploit the variation
caused by the tax reform.
3 Data Description
The data used for the analysis is the Income Panel Investigation (IPO) provided by Statistics Netherlands.
The IPO follows about 0.61 percent of individuals in the Dutch population in the period 1989-2010, and
it follows all the household members of the original 0.61 percent. Individuals in the panel are unaware
of their participation in the sample. In 1989 the dataset contained data on 210,000 individuals in 75,000
households. The size of the sample has steadily increased to correct for the increase in the population by
adding newborns and immigrants such that the final sample size in 2010 consists of 270,000 individuals
in 94,000 households. The sample is not entirely representative for the Dutch population because some
groups were deliberately oversampled. However, sampling weights are provided.
For the purpose of this study, the IPO has been extended to contain administrative data on household
wealth and portfolio composition. Data are collected at the household level through administrative tax
records. The data contain financial wealth in three broad categories: financial wealth, housing wealth
and closely-held corporations. All wealth is subdivided in assets and liabilities and for financial wealth
they are further subdivided into saving accounts, stock, bonds, real estate and other assets. Loans,
including mortgage loans, savings and checkings account are valued in their cash value. Stocks and
bonds are valued at market prices. Dutch municipalities measure the value of all real estate in order to
collect property taxes. These valuation have been used for real estate. Unfortunately, I have no data on
the height of the property taxes themselves. However, there was no reform in the property taxes in the
studied period. Therefore, this omission likely does not influence my results.
The dataset also contains some information on the taxable part of capital income. In particular,
the data have some information on the cash returns. In the data, cash returns on financial wealth are
measured as the sum of dividends, the difference between interest received and interest paid on all loans
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except the mortgage, and imputed returns on all real estate except the owner-occupied house divided by
total financial wealth. Cash returns on housing wealth are defined as the difference between the imputed
return on the owner-occupied house and interest paid over the mortage divided by total housing wealth.
In the pre-reform period cash returns on both financial wealth and housing wealth are available. In
the post-reform period cash returns on housing are observed but there are no accurate observations on
returns on financial wealth since the government did not need to collect this information anymore after
abolishing the capital-income tax on these assets. Note that even in the pre-reform actual returns on
assets may be significantly larger than the cash returns due to the fact that capital gains are not reported
at all.
The dataset also contains additional information on households such as primary income from labor-,
transfer- and subsidy-income, gross income, taxable income after deductions, net income and disposable
income at the individual level as well as many other income-related variables. Demographic variables
such as age, region and country of origin are also included.
I study the data of households in the period 1995-2004. By exploiting the pre-reform period of 1995-
1999, I can control for portfolio dynamics. In 2000 the reform was announced. Announcement effects
are likely to bias the estimates and as such I do not use data on wealth or capital income from 2000.
The main estimation period runs from 1999-2004 and allows for estimation of the effects of the reform
in both the short, 1999-2001, and long run, 1999-2004.
From the original data I select a balanced panel comprising the period 1999-2004. From these
observations, I select the households whose structure has remained unchanged throughout the sample
period. In particular, observations where households merged by marriage or cohabitation, or separated by
divorce or death of one of the main partners were deleted from the sample. It is likely that the savings
behavior of these households changed for reasons entirely unrelated to the tax reform. Observations
where the size of the household increases through childbirth or decreases by one of the children leaving
the house remain in the sample. In addition, I removed individuals that were in an institutional house
during any of the years.
As mentioned in the previous section, I also filter out all households that own closely-held corpora-
tions, as well as self-employed individuals. In addition, I have filtered out all households that do not
own positive financial and/or housing wealth. That is, I remove all non-home owners from the sample.
Therefore, in this study I focus entirely on the intensive-margin portfolio choice. Finally, I remove out-
liers defined as households with reported cash returns lower than -20 percent or higher than 50 percent.
The large returns for these households may stem from households that underreport their wealth. This is
a particular concern for households with low wealth since they were not subject to the wealth tax and as
such could not be penalized for underreporting their wealth. The summary statistics of the final sample
for post- and pre-reform periods can be found in table 2. The appendix reports summary statistics for the
unfiltered sample. All monetary values in the table are reported in 1999 euros. Pre-reform, net-return
and after-tax returns on assets have been calculated by dividing cash and imputed income on wealth by
wealth. In the post-reform period, returns are calculated under the assumption that before-tax returns
were equal to returns in the pre-reform periods such that all the variation is driven by the change in the
capital tax.
4 Methodology
It is clear that the tax reform provides many sources of variation in household’s investment decisions.
The upside of such a large reform is that the after-tax return on assets changed for almost all households.
In addition, it has been shown in a large number of studies that portfolio choice and savings are strongly
correlated to wealth and income (see e.g. Poterba, 2002, Campbell, 2006 and Attanasio and Weber,
2010). However, figures 1-6 show scatterplots of the relative change in the after-tax return on financial,
housing and total wealth as a function of household pre-reform primary labor income and wealth under
the assumption that the before-tax returns remain constant. As can be seen from the figures, there is
very weak correlation between the change in the after-tax return and income and wealth. In addition,
there is variation at all levels of wealth. It is therefore possible to control for these variables explicitly
without soaking up any of the variation in the after-tax returns.
Note further that the variation in the return on housing and total wealth is very large for low levels
of wealth. This may be due to the fact that homeowners with little housing wealth are highly leveraged.
In that case, a small change in the tax rate induces a large change in the after-tax return on housing
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Main Estimation Panel
Variable Pre-reform (1995-1999) Postreform (2001-2004)
Mean Mean Std Mean Mean Std
Single 0.082 0.272 0.063 0.242
Couple 0.376 0.484 0.391 0.488
Single with child 0.010 0.098 0.007 0.081
Couple with child 0.532 0.499 0.540 0.498
Nr Children¡18 1.002 1.089 1.101 1.177
Nr Household Members 3.072 1.206 3.350 1.248
Age 41.117 9.339 45.797 9.435
Wealth 118,965 118,343 219,544 244,821
Share Financial Wealth 0.279 0.261 0.220 0.209
Primary Household Labor Income 49,143 23,935 58,093 31,817
Effective Wealth Tax Rate 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.006
Marginal Income Tax Rate 0.438 0.077 0.423 0.052
Net After-Tax Return Financial Wealth 0.007 0.203 0.006 0.034
Net After-Tax Return Housing Wealth -0.087 0.313 -0.023 0.144
Net After-Tax Return Total Wealth -0.029 0.132 -0.013 0.035
Nr of observations 12,831 12,831
Note: Summary statistics of the filtered sample. Pre-reform nr of observations were taken in
1999. All monetary values are expressed in 1999 euros. Post-reform returns are calculated under the
assumption that before-tax returns remained equal, such that only the tax rate changes. Mean std
denotes the mean standard deviation over all years.
wealth. In my robustness analysis, I focus on a subsample with relatively high wealth-levels to see if
excluding this group has a strong impact on my estimates.
In order to estimate the effect of the simultaneous change in the wealth and capital income tax
on portfolio composition and savings it is necessary to take some structural assumptions in order to
aggregate the reforms into a statistic. In addition, cash returns on wealth in the post-reform period
are not accurately observed and capital gains are not observed at all. Finally, there may be multiple
sources of endogeneity related to the non-linearity in the tax rate, and the relationship between wealth
accumulation and portfolio composition. In this section I will first derive a semi-structural model for asset
demand and a semi-structural model for wealth accumulation. Finally, a separate subsection explains
the strategy to deal with potential endogeneity.
4.1 A Model of Asset Demand
In this paper I study two household decisions. I study the trade-off between consumption and savings,
and I study the trade-off between the different assets in the portfolio. In CCAPM it is shown that you
can split up this decision into two stages. In the first stage households choose how much to save and how
much to consume. In the second stage they choose their optimal portfolio-composition by maximizing
a mean-variance utility function. I follow this approach and split up my estimation in a first stage
where the dependent variable is accumulated wealth, and a second stage where the dependent variable
is the share of financial wealth in total wealth. By backward induction, I will first derive the estimating
equation in the second stage where the household chooses its optimal portfolio composition. Assume the
household chooses its portfolio shares in each period to maximize a mean-variance utility function of its
portfolio returns:
fi
(
Et
[
RWit
]
, Et
[(
RWit − Et
(
RWit
))2])
,
where Et is the expectation operator in period t. It is well-known since Domar and Musgrave (1944) that
capital-income taxation generally affects both the mean and the variance of the investment. A positive
capital-income tax rate decreases the mean return on investment but at the same time it decreases the
variance by letting the government share part of the losses. On the other hand, a wealth tax only
affects the mean return since the size of the wealth tax is unrelated to the return obtained on the
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Figure 1: The Change in Return on Financial Wealth Between 1999-2001 as Function of Base Year
Income
Note: Figure shows a scatterplot for all households of the relative change in the gross after-tax return on financial
wealth between 1999-2001 against base year primary labor income.
Figure 2: The Change in Return on Financial Wealth Between 1999-2001 as Function of Base Year
Wealth
Note: Figure shows a scatterplot for all households of the relative change in the gross after-tax return on financial
wealth between 1999-2001 against base year total wealth.
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Figure 3: The Change in Return on Housing Wealth Between 1999-2001 as Function of Base Year Income
Note: Figure shows a scatterplot for all households of the relative change in the gross after-tax return on housing
wealth between 1999-2001 against base year primary labor income.
Figure 4: The Change in Return on Housing Wealth Between 1999-2001 as Function of Base Year Wealth
Note: Figure shows a scatterplot for all households of the relative change in the gross after-tax return on housing
wealth between 1999-2001 against base year total wealth.
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Figure 5: The Change in Return on Total Wealth Between 1999-2001 as Function of Base Year Income
Note: Figure shows a scatterplot for all households of the relative change in the gross after-tax return on total
wealth between 1999-2001 against base year primary labor income.
Figure 6: The Change in Return on Total Wealth Between 1999-2001 as Function of Base Year Wealth
Note: Figure shows a scatterplot for all households of the relative change in the gross after-tax return on total
wealth between 1999-2001 against base year total wealth.
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asset. Therefore, it might be expected that abolishing the capital-income taxes on the cash-returns of
financial wealth and the abolishment of wealth taxes on housing wealth affected both the mean return
and the variance of the assets. In this case, identification becomes difficult because it is unclear whether
the behavioral changes of the reform were caused by a change in the mean or in the variance of the
return. Fortunately for the econometrician, the Dutch government only taxes cash returns. Of these,
both imputed returns on real estate and interest payments on loans, savings accounts and government
bonds are generally known before the household makes an investment decision. Dividend pay-outs are
arguably somewhat more volatile, but are still far less volatile than capital gains (see e.g. Shiller, 1981
and LeRoy and Porter, 1981). Therefore, I take the strong assumption that the taxable part of returns,
Rjit, is non-random at period t. I assume that untaxed returns are random variables and the vector of
untaxed returns on financial and housing wealth follows a normal distribution:
r∗it˜N (µit,Σit) .
where µit is a vector,
[
µFit, µ
H
it
]
of the mean returns on financial and housing wealth, and Σit the variance-
covariance matrix of returns. The expected portfolio return can be written as:
Et
[
RWit
]
= Et
[
αFitR
F
it +
(
1− αFit
)
RHit
]
The variance of the return is given by:
Et
[(
RWit − Et
(
RWit
))2]
=
(
αFit
)2
σFFit + 2α
F
it
(
1− αFit
)
σFHit +
(
1− αFit
)2
σHHit ,
where σjk denotes the covariance of assets j and k. As can be seen, the variance of the portfolio is
independent of the tax rate. From the first-order condition of the household one can derive the demand
for the share of financial wealth in the portfolio as a function of the after-tax returns on financial wealth
and housing wealth. Asset pricing theory predicts that the share increases in the return on financial
wealth and the variance in housing wealth and decreases in the return on housing wealth and the variance
in financial wealth. Assume, as is standard in the literature (see e.g. King and Leape, 1998), that the
log share of assets is log-linear in each of the returns, and separable in all returns and the variance. In
that case the log share of financial wealth can be written as:
lnαFit = ζi + ηt +
∑
j∈{F,H}
εj lnEt
[
RJit
]
+ gi (Σi) + νit,
where ζi, is a household-specific intercept, ηt a period-specifc effect, ε
j is the elasticity of the share with
respect to return wealth type j, gi (.) is a general function of the variance-covariance matrix and νit
is the error term. In order to estimate this model, using variation induced by the reform, I take first
differences over the reform:
∆ lnαFir = γ +
∑
j∈{F,H}
εj∆ lnEr
[
Rjir
]
+ ∆νir,
where ∆xir denotes the difference of variable x between the post-reform period r and the base year b
and γF = ∆ηFt . Further simplify the equation by writing out the expectations:
∆ lnαFir = γ +
∑
j∈{F,H}
εj
(
∆rjir −∆
[
T jirr
j
ir
]
−∆τ jir + ∆µjir
)
+ ∆νir, (2)
= γ + εF
(
∆rFir + T
F
ib r
F
ib −∆τFir + ∆µFir
)
+ εH
(
∆rHir −∆
[
THir r
H
ir
]
+ τHib + ∆µ
H
ir
)
+ ∆νir,
where I have used the approximation ln (1 + x) ≈ x and the fact that TFir = τHir = 0. Clearly, direct
estimation of (2) is problematic because we do not observe actual changes in the returns since returns
are entirely unobserved after the reform. However, this omitted variable will not bias the final estimates
as long as, after controlling for variables Xi, it is uncorrelated to the tax-induced change in the after-tax
return on each asset. Control variables in Xi should obviously include variables that somehow influence
household investment behavior and may be correlated to the change in the tax rate. I will first introduce
the control variables that I will add to the model, before discussing the validity of this crucial assumption.
The first variable I include in Xi is the total sum of primary labor income the household earned
during the reform period. Here primary labor income includes all taxes and employee and employer
premiums. This variable is meant to capture the amount of disposable income a household had available
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during the reform period. Clearly, households that had a lot of income during the reform period might
save more than households that received less income. In addition, households with more income might
use different investment instruments. Finally, primary income may be seen as a good control variable
measuring ability of the household.
Furthermore, Xi contains base-year wealth and base-year savings to control for portfolio dynamics
such as mean reversion and persistence. In addition, I have added wealth splines toXi. The wealth splines
are dummy variables indicating whether a household was in a specific decile of the wealth distribution
in 1999. These spline terms control for possible exogenous dispersion in the wealth distribution, as in
Gruber and Saez (2002).
In addition, I control for age of the primary income earner using age dummies. It is likely that
households with old primary income earners invest less, and less risky, than households with younger
income earners due to the fact that the probability of death increases with age. Finally, I control for
household type and household composition.
As mentioned before, the question is whether conditional on the Xi just mentioned, the omitted
variables are uncorrelated to the tax-induced changes in the after-tax return. This condition is very likely
satisfied in the market for financial wealth. The Netherlands is a small open economy and it is unlikely
that the Dutch tax reform affected world market returns in any significant way. On the other hand,
returns in the much less international housing market might be affected by the tax reform. However,
estimation results remain valid as long as the tax reform affected the housing market symmetrically or its
effect was assymetric, but strongly correlated with control variables in Xi. Especially the latter scenario
seems likely. Although households with different wealth or income levels may have faced different shocks
in their before-tax housing return, it seems unlikely that within these wealth and income classes the
change in housing returns was somehow directly related to the tax rate. The assumption allows me to
make the following substitution:
εF
(
∆rFir + ∆µ
F
ir
)
+ εH
((
1− THir
)
∆rHir + ∆µ
H
ir
)
+ ∆νir = Xiβ + ξir, (3)
where ξir the new error-term. Through the substitution all variables relating to the change in before-tax
return drop out. Note again that Xi should absorb all variation in the after-tax return that is unobserved
but possibly correlated to the change in the capital taxes. Inserting (3) into equation (2) we arrive at
an estimation equation with only observable variables:
∆ lnαFir = γ + ε
F
(
TFib r
F
ib −∆τFir
)
+ εH
(
τHib −∆
[
THir
]
rHib
)
+Xiβ + ξir. (4)
Note that a similar equation could be set up for the change in the log share of housing wealth. However,
since both shares add up to one, such an equation would give no additional information with respect to
the information contained in equation (4). If an increase in the return on housing decreases the share
of financial wealth, than by definition it must also increase the share of housing wealth by the same
percentage. Hence, in order to estimate portfolio allocation in a model with two assets, one only needs
to estimate one equation.
The elasticities in equation (4) directly relate the change in portfolio share to a tax-induced change
in the after-tax return on the asset. This contrasts sharply with estimates in the US and Canada in e.g.
King and Leape (1998), Poterba and Samwick (2003) and Alan et al. (2010), where portfolio allocation
is related to an overall measure of the marginal tax rate on capital income. The results in these studies
can inform policy makers whether an increase in the marginal tax rate shifts asset demand from less
to more tax-favored assets, but are unable to inform the policy makers about the effect of increasing
the tax-favored status of a particular asset by one percent. Such inference can only be made if different
assets are taxed according to entirely different rules and effective marginal tax rate can be calculated
independently for each type of asset. An even stronger inference can be made when a country reforms
its tax system from a system where assets were taxed according to the same rules, to a system where
taxes differ along the different type of assets. It is in that respect that the Dutch 2001 capital tax reform
gives the econometrician a close to perfect natural experiment.
In addition, the tax systems in the US and Canada tax both cash and capital gains. As such, the
capital income tax lowers both the return and the risk of the asset. Hence, in the aforementioned studies it
is impossible to directly relate the change in the tax-rate to a change in the after-tax return, without also
making strong structural assumptions about the effect of taxation on the variance-covariance structure
of asset returns. By contrast the Dutch tax system affects the return but gives close to zero insurance
against asset price volatility. As such, the change in investment decisions can be related directly to the
change in the after-tax return, allowing for a more fundamental unraveling of the asset-demand equation.
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4.2 A Model of Household Wealth Accumulation
In the first stage of the household optimization problem a household decides how much to consume and
how much to save. The typical approach is to assume that it maximizes life-time utility with respect to the
intertemporal budget constraint, yielding a consumption-Euler equation. A large literature starting with
Hall (1978) has been devoted to estimating the Euler equation. Of particular interest is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, the relative increase in the rate of consumption growth as a result of a relative
increase in the return on the portfolio. In many models of capital taxation the intertemporal elasticity
is a sufficient statistic for the distortion induced by capital taxation. However, directly estimating the
Euler equation may be difficult due to endogeneity. Many factors such as business cycle fluctuation
likely affect both the rate of consumption growth and portfolio returns. In addition, it is difficult to
come up with instruments which are correlated to the interest rate but not directly correlated to the rate
of consumption growth. As a result estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution are sensitive
to the instrument used.
The 2001 tax reform in the Netherlands is a strong candidate for an instrument, since it affected after-
tax returns without additionally affecting consumption directly. Unfortunately, the IPO data cannot be
used to deduce household consumption levels, because in the intertemporal budget constraint (1) a large
part of the returns are unobserved. However, wealth accumulation can be observed. Although, the effect
of taxation on wealth accumulation does not give exact information on the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, unless you are willing to take strong structural assumptions, it does give policy makers an
indication of the intertemporal distortion created by capital taxation. In addition, what is lacking in
terms of estimating the relevant preference parameter, is made up for in precision by using a particulary
strong instrument.
To estimate the effect of the 2001 reform on capital accumulation I assume that the demand for log
wealth is linear in the expected log return on wealth:
logWit = ζi + ηt + ε logEr
[
RWit
]
+ νir., (5)
where γ is a constant, ε is the elasticity of wealth with respect to the after-tax return on wealth and ξir
is the error-term. Note that the sign of ε is not a-priori determined by economic theory. An increase
in the after-tax return leads to a substitution effect where people consume more in the future and less
now. As is noted in Summers (1981) the substitution effect is reinforced by a negative wealth effect.
The increase in the financial discount rate decreases the discounted value of future labor income. This
wealth effects decreases consumption in each period, and hence, increases savings. However, households
with positive wealth holdings also experience a positive wealth effect since the discounted value of their
financial wealth increases with the interest rate. As such, households are induced to consume more in
each period. In order to achieve this they have to consume part of their current wealth holdings. If the
substitution effect dominates ε is greater than zero and vice versa if the wealth effect dominates. Note
that the sign of ε corresponds directly to the sign of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Taking first differences over equation (5) we arrive at:
∆ logWir = γ + δ∆ logEr [Rir] + ∆νir,
where γ = ∆ηt. The equation can be further simplified by writing out expected portfolio returns and
using log (1 + x) ≈ x:
∆ logWir = γ + ε
∑
j∈{F,H}
∆
[
αjir
(
rjir − T jirrjir − τ jir + µjir
)]
+ ∆νir,
= γ + ε
∑
j∈{F,H}
∆αjir
((
1− T jib
)
rjib − τ jib
)
+
ε
∑
j∈{F,H}
αjir
(
∆rjir −∆
[
T jirr
j
ir
]
−∆τ jir
)
+ ∆
[
αjirµ
j
ir
]
+ ∆νir (6)
where αhit = 1 − αfit is the share of housing wealth in total wealth. Note that the change in before-tax
returns is not observed. However, I have already assumed that, conditional on Xi, the change in the
unobserved variables is independent to the change in the tax-rate. Hence, also here I can make the
following substitution: ∑
j∈{F,H}
αjir
(
1− T jir
)
∆rjir + ∆
[
αjirµ
j
ir
]
+ ∆νir = Xiβ + ξir. (7)
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Substitute equation (7) into (6) to arrive at the final relationship:
∆ logWit = γ + ε
 ∑
j∈{F,H}
∆αjir
(
rjib − T jibrjib − τ jib
)
− αjir
(
∆T jirr
j
ib + ∆τ
j
ir
)+Xiβ + ξir. (8)
Equation (8) gives the relationship between wealth accumulation and a tax-induced change in the after-
tax return, expressed entirely in observables.
4.3 Endogeneity
Figure 7: A Flow Chart of the Chain of Causality
Note: Figure depicts the chain of causality. Solid lines depict the main causal relationship this study tries to
investigate, the two fat solid lines indicate the two main estimation equations, dashed lines indicate potential
reverse causality and the dashed-dotted line indicates the unobserved channel.
The chain of causality is described in figure 7. In the flow chart solid arrows depict causal relations.
The top fat solid arrow represents estimating equation (4) and the bottom arrow represents (8). Dashed
arrows represent potential reversely causal links and the dashed-dotted arrow represents the omitted
channel, the effect of the change in before-tax returns on after-tax returns. The flow chart starts at the
2001 reform which caused variation in the capital tax rates. In turn, the capital tax rate influenced the
after-tax return on each of the two wealth types. Equation (4) has portfolio composition as a dependent
variable and the after-tax return on each asset as the main independent variables. Both the change in
portfolio composition and the change in the after-tax returns on each asset influence the return on the
portfolio. Equation (4) has the change in wealth as a dependent variable and the change in the after-tax
return on the portfolio as an independent variable.
As was argued in the previous subsection, the omitted change in before-tax returns might not be
problematic as long as the change in those returns are, conditional on Xi, uncorrelated to the change
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in the tax-rate. However, there are also three potential reverse causal links. First, the capital tax rate
may depend on the change in asset composition in the portfolio. For example, the reform might have
incentivized some households to shift their financial wealth to housing wealth in order to bring financial
wealth below the taxable threshold. In addition, households might decide to reduce their total wealth in
order to bring their financial wealth below the threshold.
The standard approach in empirical tax reform studies to remove this reverse causal link consists of
two steps. First, use all available information to predict what the dependent variable would have been
had there not been a tax reform. Subsequently, use the new tax system to calculate what the tax rate
would have been under the predicted value of the dependent variable (see e.g. Feldstein, 1995, Gruber
and Saez, 2002 and Kleven and Schultz, forthcoming).10
Since non-capital income and income from housing wealth are taxed synthetically, and non-capital
income is orders of maginitude higher than housing income, the tax rate on housing wealth is close to
independent of the amount of housing wealth a household owns. As such, there should not be a large
endogeneity issue with the after-tax return on housing. However, in the market for financial wealth, the
endogeneity problem might be larger. Households can directly affect their tax rate by saving above or
below their threshold. Therefore, I estimate a simple savings model on pre-reform data reaching back
to 1995 in order to estimate what total wealth would be, had there been no reform. The dependent
variable in this equation is household savings as measured by the relative increase in wealth, ∆ lnWit.
I subsequently use this model to predict what total wealth would have been without a reform. I then
predict financial wealth by assuming that the share of financial wealth in the post-reform year is equal
to the share of financial wealth in the base-year 1999, αfib. The underlying assumption is that the share
invested in financial wealth αfit is a stationary variable such that the base year share is a good predictor
for what the share would have been in the post-reform year, had there been no reform.
The model used to predict savings is given by:
∆ lnWit = Xitβ + γi + ηt + νit.
Independent variables in Xit are the lagged value of wealth and savings to control for possible mean
reversion in portfolio dynamics. In addition, it contains the log of primary income from labor, the
number of children, the number of household members, the type of household and age dummies for
the age of the primary earner in the household. Since lagged savings can only be calculated from 1997
onwards the model is estimated in the period 1997-1999. Prediction takes place according to an iterative
process. First, savings are predicted for 2000:
∆ ln Wˆi,2000 = Xi,2000β + γi + η2000.
Obviously, η2000 does not follow directly from the model. However, I use the fact that in any model
where η2000 would be estimated its value would be the difference between the cross-sectional mean of the
dependent variable and the mean of its predicted value. That is,
η2000 = ∆ lnWi,2000 −
(
Xi,2000β + γi
)
,
where a bar over a variable denotes its cross-sectional mean. Subsequently, I estimate wealth holdings
in 2000 by using:
ln Wˆi,2000 = lnWi,1999 + ∆ ln Wˆi,2000. (9)
I then update Xi2001 by including predicted values of wealth and savings and again use the model to
predict savings and wealth in 2001. The iterative process ends in the final period, 2004. In each post-
reform year tax rules are applied to the predicted wealth level in order to estimate what the tax rate
would have been if the tax reform had not affected household behavior. Finally, I use predicted instead
of actual tax rates in the estimation of equation (4) and (8).
The second possible channel for reverse causality is the effect a change in wealth may have on the
change in portfolio composition. Empirically portfolio composition is correlated with wealth (see e.g.
Poterba, 2002, Campbell, 2006 and Attanasio and Weber, 2010). In addition, households may be limited
in the amount of wealth they can invest in their house, in particular in the short run when they cannot
change their mortgage. As such, a change in portfolio composition might be caused by a change of
wealth. The econometric methodology in this paper allows for a straightforward approach to solve this
issue. Equation (4) can be used to predict portfolio composition. Instruments are the change in the
10See Weber (2013) for a discussion of the validity of this approach.
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after-tax returns on each asset. Instrument validity requires that the change in the after-tax return is
strongly correlated with the change in portfolio-composition, and hence, with the change in the after-tax
return on the portfolio. In the results section it is shown that this is indeed the case.
Second, the exclusion restriction requires that the change in the after-tax return can only be related
to the change in wealth through the change in the after-tax return. Note that standard tests for the
exclusion restriction such as the Sargan-Hansen test (see Sargan, 1958 and Hansen, 1982) cannot be
used here because instrumentation is non-linear. That is, the effect of the change in the after-tax return
on each asset on the change in portfolio composition is estimated using linear regression. However, the
after-tax return additionally has a direct effect on the after-tax return of the portfolio as can be seen
in figure 7 by the arrow going from the after-tax return on each asset to the after-tax return on the
portfolio. Hence, in equation (8), if αHit is instrumented using r
j
it, equation (8) becomes non-linear in
rjit. However, there is no reason to assume that the tax-rate on each asset has a direct effect on wealth
accumulation, other than through its effect on the after-tax return on the portfolio. Hence, I simply
assume that the exclusion restriction is satisfied.
Under the assumption that the relative change in after-tax return on each asset is a valid instrument,
equation (8) can be estimated using portfolio shares predicted in (4). This second instrumentation step
is not standard in the literature. Therefore, in the sensitivity analysis I also study this equation with
actual instead of instrumented shares to see if it has a strong effect on the results.
5 Results
5.1 First Stage
Table 3: First-Stage Results
Variables Change in Log Wealth
Log Wealth t-1 -1.322***
(0.00649)
Change in Log Wealth t-1 0.133***
(0.00415)
Log Prim. Labor Inc. 0.0331***
(0.00796)
Log prim. Labor Inc. t-1 -0.00644
(0.00781)
Observations 89113
R-squared 0.604
Note: Dependent variable is change in log wealth. The
regression equation is estimated using individual- and year
fixed effects. In addition, age and household controls have
been included in the estimation. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 3 represents the first-stage estimates. Regression tables in this and the following section only
show the main covariates. Coefficients for the full set of covariates for each table can be found in appendix
B. As can be seen, there is strong mean reversion in wealth accumulation. Households with higher levels
of wealth save less in the next period. However, additionally, there is some persistence in savings since
households with higher lagged growth in their wealth seem to save more in the next period. As expected,
households with higher labor income save more. Lagged income does not seem to be correlated with
current savings. Results from these first-stage estimates are used to instrument the post-reform tax rate.
5.2 Long-Run Effects on Portfolio Composition
Table 4 presents the first set of main results. It considers the long-run effects of the reform on portfolio
allocation. As can be seen, the change in the after-tax return is positively correlated with the share of
financial wealth in the portfolio. Elasticities range from 2.606-4.159 depending on the control variables
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Table 4: Long-Run Effects on Portfolio Composition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV IV IV IV IV IV
Rel. Ch. RF 2.715*** 2.606*** 3.645*** 2.696*** 3.774*** 4.159***
(0.856) (0.884) (0.751) (0.883) (0.749) (0.741)
Rel. Ch. RH -0.00622*** -0.0113*** -0.0174** -0.0112*** -0.0174** -0.0178**
(0.00210) (0.00245) (0.00717) (0.00242) (0.00717) (0.00743)
Log Savings 1999 -0.0944*** -0.0845*** -0.0830***
(0.0311) (0.0314) (0.0313)
Log Wealth 1999 -0.0329 0.134*** 0.139***
(0.0525) (0.0185) (0.0185)
Control for:
Splines YES NO NO NO NO NO
Prim. Labor Income YES YES YES NO NO NO
Hh/Age Effects YES YES YES YES YES NO
Observations 12261 12261 13885 12261 13885 13885
R-squared 0.036 0.022 0.018 0.021 0.017 0.006
Note: Dependent variable is relative change in the share of financial wealth between 1999-2004.
IV-estimates using instrumented tax rates. Splines are linear decile spline terms over the wealth distri-
bution. Primary labor income is a term containing the log of the sum of primary labor income earned
between 1999-2004. Household and age effects include household type dummies, number of children
below 18 in the household, number of members in the household and age dummies for the primary
income earner. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
included in the regression. The first column includes all control variables and it presents the preferred
estimate of the elasticity at 2.715. This indicates that a one percent increase in the after-tax return
increases the share of financial wealth in total wealth by 2.715 percent.
At first sight this effect seems rather large. However, recall that by the approximation ln(1+x) ≈ x, a
one percentage point increase in the wealth tax on financial assets decreases the gross return on financial
assets by one percent. Since the current wealth tax rate is 1.2 percent, a one-percentage point increase
in this tax rate corresponds to an 1/1.2 = 83 percentage increase in the tax rate. Therefore, these results
imply that a one percent increase in the wealth tax on financial assets decreases the share of financial
assets in the portfolio by 2.715/83 = 0.033 percentage. Hence, the effect of taxation on asset allocation is
relatively modest. A close to doubling of the wealth tax decreases financial assets by only 0.033 percent.
This finding corresponds with recent findings in Alan et al. (2010) but are in stark contrast to earlier
findings using cross-sectional data in e.g. Feldstein (1976), King and Leape (1998) and Poterba and
Samwick (2003) who find strong effects of taxation on portfolio allocation. To my knowledge this study
is the first to quantify the exact response of portfolio-allocation to a tax-induced change in the gross
after-tax return on the asset.
The second row measures the effect of an increase in the return on housing wealth. As can be seen,
an increase in the return on housing wealth slightly decreases the share invested in financial wealth,
although the effect is much smaller. This asymmetric response could be explained by the fact that it is
more costly for households to adjust their housing wealth. Households can increase their housing wealth
by paying off their mortgage or by buying a new house. The former may be costly because households
mortgage contracts usually fine households when they pay of more than the contracted amount. The
latter is very costly due to moving cost and a 6 percent stamp duty that the government charges upon
real estate transaction of owner-occupied houses.
Combining estimates from the first and second row of table 4 creates an interesting picture of house-
hold portfolio behavior. An increase in the return on financial wealth induces households to buy more
financial wealth. Housing wealth remains remains unaffected due to high transaction costs, but since
total wealth goes up, housing wealth as a percentage of total wealth goes down. On the other hand,
an increase in the return on housing wealth does not induce households to buy more economically sig-
nificantly more housing wealth, due to the transaction costs involved in buying housing wealth. Hence,
there seems to be very little response to a change in the return on housing wealth.
With respect to the control variables, the change in the share invested in financial assets is decreasing
in base-year savings, indicating that those individuals who have saved a lot in 1999 are less likely to
save in financial assets in future periods. Wealth is uncorrelated to the change in the share invested in
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financial assets except when I do not control for wealth splines.
The size of both elasticities is sensitive with respect to the control variables used. In particular, the
elasticities get larger when I do not control for household and age effects and when I do not control
for portfolio dynamics by including base-year savings and wealth. In addition, the elasticity of the
housing return is rather sensitive with respect to the use of splines. This indicates a slight positive
correlation between the (instrumented) change in the after-tax return on the wealth types and each of
these variables. However, the elasticities remain significant and of expected sign in each specification.
In addition as has been argued above, even when the elasticity is at its highest, the effect of taxation on
portfolio composition is rather modest.
5.3 Long-Run Effects on Wealth Accumulation
Table 5: Long-Run Effects on Wealth Accumulation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV-IV IV-IV IV-IV IV-IV IV-IV IV-IV
Rel. Ch. RW 3.031*** 2.775*** 4.256*** 2.808*** 4.257*** 4.318***
(0.431) (0.353) (0.429) (0.355) (0.429) (0.432)
Savings 1999 -0.0959*** -0.0957*** -0.0941***
(0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0121)
Wealth 1999 -0.210*** -0.263*** -0.257***
(0.0273) (0.00977) (0.00971)
Control for:
Splines YES NO NO NO NO NO
Prim. Labor Income YES YES YES NO NO NO
Hh/Age Effects YES YES YES YES YES NO
Observations 12261 12261 12261 12261 12261 12261
R-squared 0.356 0.343 0.230 0.340 0.230 0.218
Note: Dependent variable is relative change in wealth between 1999-2004. IV-estimates using
instrumented tax rates and portfolio shares. Splines are linear decile spline terms over the wealth
distribution. Primary labor income is a term containing the log of the sum of primary labor income
earned between 1999-2004. Household and age effects include household type dummies, number of
children below 18 in the household, number of members in the household and age dummies for the
primary income earner. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
In table 5 I study the first stage of the household optimization problem, the trade-off between con-
sumptions and savings. Results from the first column of table 4 were used to instrument for portfolio
composition. My estimates show that a 1 percent increase in the after-tax return on the portfolio, re-
duces savings by somewhere between 2.775-4.318 percent. The preferred estimates are again shown in
the first column where the elasticity equals 3.031. Under all specifications the elasticity is statistically
significant at the one- percent level and positive. This indicates that the substitution effect dominates
the income effect. This result indicates that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is positive and
this is in correspondence with all recent findings (see e.g. Attanasio and Weber, 1993, Blundell et al.,
1994, Attanasio and Browning, 1995 and Engelhardt and Kumar, 2009).
By the same argument as in the previous subsection, the estimated elasticity indicates that a one
percent increase in a hypothetical wealth tax over all wealth of 1.2 percent, decreases savings by 0.036
percent. Hence, also here, the distortinary effect of taxation on wealth accumulation is relatively modest.
Controls for portfolio dynamics show a strong indication for mean reversion. Wealth accumulated
during the reform period is decreasing in base-year wealth and in base-year savings.
Results are sensitive to the use of control variables. In particular, the elasticity becomes somewhat
larger when I do not control for portfolio dynamics and become smaller when I do not control for wealth
splines.
5.4 Short-Run Effects on Portfolio Composition
Next, I study the short-run effect of the reform on portfolio composition in table 6 by taking the difference
between the base year 1999 and the first post-reform year 2001. It is interesting to compare the short-
run effects to the long-run effects since this may be indicative of how fast households can adjust their
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Table 6: Short-Run Effects on Portfolio Composition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV IV IV IV IV IV
Rel. Ch. RF 2.269*** 3.368*** 3.288*** 2.235*** 3.368*** 3.882***
(0.749) (0.648) (0.649) (0.760) (0.648) (0.641)
Rel. Ch. RH -0.00366 -0.0146* -0.0146* -0.00837*** -0.0146* -0.0147*
(0.00241) (0.00747) (0.00746) (0.00325) (0.00747) (0.00789)
Savings 1999 -0.0658** -0.0521*
(0.0271) (0.0273)
Wealth 1999 -0.0146 0.121***
(0.0417) (0.0157)
Control for:
Splines YES NO NO NO NO NO
Prim. Labor Income YES YES YES NO NO NO
Hh/Age Effects YES YES YES YES YES NO
Observations 15487 17570 17570 15487 17570 17570
R-squared 0.031 0.017 0.017 0.020 0.017 0.005
Note: Dependent variable is relative change in the share of financial wealth between 1999-2001.
IV-estimates using instrumented tax rates. Splines are linear decile spline terms over the wealth
distribution. Primary labor income is a term containing the log of the sum of primary labor income
earned between 1999-2001. Household and age effects include household type dummies, number of
children below 18 in the household, number of members in the household and age dummies for the
primary income earner. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
portfolio. In the preferred estimate, reported in the first column, the elasticity of the share invested in
financial wealth with respect to the return on financial wealth equals 2.269. Surprisingly this elasticity
is almost as high as the long-run elasticity, indicating that households reacted to the reform almost
instantaneously.
The fast response may be explained by optimization frictions. The 2001 reform brought such a radical
change in portfolio returns that households had to respond lest they would end up with highly inefficient
portfolios. As a result, they responded right away. After the reform the returns did not fluctuate very
much, and as a result, the households did not make anymore adjustments.
On the other hand, the elasticity with respect to the return on housing wealth is not significant. This
again indicates that households react less strongly to changes in the return on housing wealth then to
the return on financial assets.
Results are sensitive to the use of control variables where in some specifications the short-run elasticity
exceeds the long-run elasticity. This could be seen as evidence for misspecification in those models since
it seems unlikely that households overshoot their optimal portfolio allocation in the short run, especially
if there are transaction costs.
Finally, note that there are slightly more observations in the short-run estimates than in the long-run
estimates. This attrition is due to mortality and emigration, marriage and divorce, or missing variables
somewhere in the period 2002-2004.
5.5 Short-Run Effects on Wealth Accumulation
In table 7 I present the short-run effects of the tax reform on wealth accumulation. One would expect
that an increase in the after-tax return induces households to save more (or less if the income effect
dominates) each period. Surprisingly, the preferred estimate the short-run elasticity of 2.739 is only
slightly smaller than the long-run estimate. This indicates that households adjust their accumulated
wealth immediately to the new after-tax return, but only slightly change their yearly savings in the
periods afterward. This might again be the result of optimization frictions.
As mentioned before, it is not possible to directly compare estimates in this paper to estimates of the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. However, Attanasio and Wakefield (2010) perform a simulation
for the UK where the after-tax net return is increased from 2 to 2.5 percent, using a life-cylce model. In
their baseline simulation the elasticity of substitution equals 1. The simulations show that accumulated
wealth may increase by as much as 18 percent at retirement age and by a very significant amount at all
ages. On the other hand, estimates in this paper suggest that an increase in the net after-tax return
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Table 7: Short-Run Effects on Wealth Accumulation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV-IV IV-IV IV-IV IV-IV IV-IV IV-IV
Rel. Ch. RW 2.739*** 3.491*** 3.491*** 2.365*** 3.491*** 3.548***
(0.407) (0.366) (0.366) (0.305) (0.366) (0.368)
Savings 1999 -0.0917*** -0.0895***
(0.00996) (0.00989)
Wealth 1999 -0.187*** -0.239***
(0.0194) (0.00854)
Control for:
Splines YES NO NO NO NO NO
Prim. Labor Income YES YES YES NO NO NO
Hh/Age Effects YES YES YES YES YES NO
Observations 15487 15487 15487 15487 15487 15487
R-squared 0.346 0.222 0.222 0.326 0.222 0.211
Note: Dependent variable is relative change in wealth between 1999-2001. IV-estimates using
instrumented tax rates and portfolio shares. Splines are linear decile spline terms over the wealth
distribution. Primary labor income is a term containing the log of the sum of primary labor income
earned between 1999-2001. Household and age effects include household type dummies, number of
children below 18 in the household, number of members in the household and age dummies for the
primary income earner. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
of 0.5 percentage point increases average wealth by approximately 0.5 × 3.031 = 1.5155 percent in the
long-run. This is far less than the simulation would indicate. Obviously, these two results are not
directly comparable since Attanasio and Wakefield (2010) study the steady-state effects in a life-cycle
model, where attaining the steady state takes the life-time of an entire generation. However, the small
effect that I find in this study coupled with the fact that short-run estimates are very close to long-run
estimates gives some tentative evidence that the elasticity of substitution in the Netherlands is smaller
than the baseline value in Attanasio and Wakefield (2010).
6 Sensitivity Analysis
6.1 Portfolio Composition
Table 8 shows a sensitivity analysis of the effects of the reform on portfolio allocation. The first column
considers only those households where the age of the primary earner is below 65 in 2004. As can be seen,
the elasticities are virtually identical to the elasticities in the initial sample.
The second column considers only those households that were above the wealth tax threshold in the
base year 1999. This sensitivity analysis serves two purposes. First, households above the wealth tax
threshold are relatively wealthy. Therefore, the analysis may help uncover potential heterogeneity in
the behavioral response between wealthy and less wealthy households. Such heterogeneity in responses
has been found in the literature in e.g. Alan et al. (2010) and might exist because wealthy households
may be different in unobservable characteristics such as transaction costs. Moreover, wealthy households
might be less liquidity constrained and therefore better able to optimally adjust their portfolio. Second,
the measurement error may be less severe for wealthy households. If a low-wealth household misreports
its wealth there is no sanction for it, as long as wealth is below the threshold. However, if households
above the threshold under report their wealth the tax authorities may sanction them severely.
As can be seen, the elasticity with respect to the return on financial wealth for this group is almost
twice as large. In addition, the elasticity with respect to the return on housing wealth increases with a
factor larger than 100. This result gives some evidence for heterogeneity in the response rate, although
the implied heterogeneity needs to be interpreted with some caution, because the lower estimate for the
initial sample may have also been driven by measurement error.
The third group shows the result of single households without children. Their response with respect
to the return on financial wealth is more than two times larger than it is for the initial sample. In
addition, their response with respect to the return on housing wealth is more than 50 times larger. This
again gives some indication of heterogeneity in the behavioral response where singles react much stronger
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Table 8: Long-Run Effects on Portfolio Composition for Different Specifi-
cations and Subsamples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
< 65 Wealth Tax Singles Incl. outliers
Rel. Ch. RF 2.786*** 3.941*** 6.438** 0.255***
(0.865) (1.102) (3.168) (0.0582)
Rel. Ch. RH -0.00621*** -7.343*** -2.843** -0.00613***
(0.00209) (1.730) (1.251) (0.00157)
Log Savings 1999 -0.0964*** -0.187*** 0.135 -0.0823**
(0.0316) (0.0452) (0.116) (0.0321)
Log Wealth 1999 -0.0304 -0.159*** 0.0221 -0.0195
(0.0584) (0.0488) (0.161) (0.0538)
Control for:
Splines YES YES YES YES
Prim. Labor Income YES YES YES YES
Hh/Age Effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 11903 8625 664 12510
R-squared 0.035 0.061 0.157 0.038
Note: Dependent variable is relative change in the share of financial wealth
between 1999-2004. IV-estimates using instrumented tax rates. Splines are linear
decile spline terms over the wealth distribution. Primary labor income is a term
containing the log of the sum of primary labor income earned between 1999-
2004. Household and age effects include household type dummies, number of
children below 18 in the household, number of members in the household and age
dummies for the primary income earner. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
to the change in the capital tax than other households. However, the results have to interpreted with
some caution, since the number of observations is relatively small.
The final robustness analysis includes outliers that were filtered out for all other estimates. As can
be seen, the number of observations increases with only 240 households. However, the response with
respect to the after-tax return on financial wealth decreases by a factor ten. This indicates that these
outliers have a very strong effect on the results.
6.2 Wealth Accumulation
Table 9 presents the sensitivity analysis of the effects of the reform on wealth accumulation. The first
column presents the results on the subsample that was younger than 65 in 2004. As can be seen, the
elasticity is not significantly different for this subsample.
The second column shows the elasticity for the group that was subject to the wealth tax. As can
be seen, the elasticity of this group is about three times larger than for the entire sample, indicating
that the wealthy may perhaps react stronger to the change in the after-tax return than the poor. A
larger response of the the wealthy may be indicative of the fact that liquidity constraints are binding for
the households with lower wealth. If liquidity constraints are binding an increase in the return on the
portfolio may relax the liquidity constraint, inducing poor households to consume more and save less.
Liquidity constraints play a similar role if the household is not currently at the liquidity constraint but
may, due to uncertainty, end up at the liquidity constraint in some state of the world (see e.g. Attanasio
and Weber, 2010). Clearly, the poor are more likely to be liquidity constrained than the rich and as
such, they are less likely to accumulate more wealth if the after-tax return on their assets goes up. The
resulting outcome would be that wealthy households have a higher elasticity which is exactly what I find.
The third column displays the results for singles. Singles also have a higher elasticity although the
number of observations is rather limited. The fourth column shows the result when outliers are included.
This does not seem to effect the elasticity at all. The final column shows the elasticity when I do not
instrument for the change in asset composition. The elasticity in this specification is still significantly
positive but almost three times smaller. This may indicate that it is indeed necessary to instrument for
reverse causality running from wealth to portfolio composition.
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Table 9: Long-Run Effects on Wealth Accumulation for Different Specifications and
Subsamples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
< 65 Wealth Tax Singles Incl. outliers IV-OLS
Rel. Ch. RW 3.008*** 9.915*** 7.822*** 3.031*** 1.091***
(0.430) (0.471) (1.012) (0.431) (0.257)
Savings 1999 -0.0967*** -0.136*** -0.0676 -0.0959*** -0.115***
(0.0122) (0.0204) (0.0417) (0.0121) (0.0122)
Wealth 1999 -0.215*** -0.191*** -0.225*** -0.210*** -0.418***
(0.0306) (0.0304) (0.0812) (0.0273) (0.0302)
Control for:
Splines YES YES YES YES YES
Prim. Labor Income YES YES YES YES YES
Hh/Age Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 11903 8625 664 12261 12831
R-squared 0.356 0.250 0.558 0.356 0.613
Note: Dependent variable is relative change in wealth between 1999-2004. IV-estimates
using instrumented tax rates and portfolio shares except in final column which only uses
instrumented tax rates. Splines are linear decile spline terms over the wealth distribution.
Primary labor income is a term containing the log of the sum of primary labor income earned
between 1999-2004. Household and age effects include household type dummies, number of
children below 18 in the household, number of members in the household and age dummies
for the primary income earner. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p <
0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I use the Dutch 2001 capital tax reform to estimate the effect of capital taxation on
households’ portfolio composition and intertemporal choice. To my knowledge this is the first study to
directly link a tax-induced change on the after-tax return on assets to the portfolio and savings decisions
of household. I find behavioral responses in the direction predicted by theory. However, in contrast
to earlier findings in the literature, the estimated effect is modest. Therefore, the distortion caused by
capital-income taxation is smaller than previously considered.
This finding is of direct impact to policy makers and researchers. A lower distortion of the capital-
income tax on wealth accumulation implies a higher optimal capital tax rate. In addition, portfolio
choice is not strongly affected by relative difference in the capital income tax rate on different assets.
This indicates that nudges may perhaps be a more effective way to affect household’s behavior (see e.g.
Madrian and Shea, 2001).
In this study I investigate portfolio responses on the intensive margin. Future research should in-
vestigate whether Dutch households respond to tax incentives on the extensive margin, and what is the
effect of pension savings on portfolio choice and wealth accumulation.
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Table 10: Summary statistics for the unfiltered sample
Variable Pre-reform (1995-1999) Postreform (2001-2004)
Mean Mean Std Mean Mean Std
Single 0.228 0.419 0.147 0.354
Couple 0.372 0.483 0.341 0.242
Single with child 0.041 0.198 0.040 0.488
Couple with child 0.359 0.479 0.472 0.081
Nr Children<18 0.743 1.066 1.016 1.190
Nr Household Members 2.567 1.336 3.142 1.423
Age 40.980 12.913 42.294 11.299
Wealth 81043.710 135244.035 136714.048 273311.630
Share Financial Wealth 0.566 0.422 0.421 0.362
Primary Household Labor Income 35518.320 27199.737 47129.161 35455.063
Effective Wealth Tax Rate 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005
Marginal Income Tax Rate 0.416 0.112 0.361 0.064
Nr of observations 42,595 57,558
Note: Summary statistics of the unfiltered sample. All monetary values are expressed in 1999 euros.
Post-reform returns are calculated under the assumption that before-tax returns remained equal, such
that only the tax rate changes. Pre-reform number of observations are taken in 1999, post-reform in
2004.
B Regression Tables with all Covariates
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Table 11: Long-Run Effects on Portfolio Composition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV IV IV IV IV IV
Rel. Ch. RF 2.715*** 2.606*** 3.645*** 2.696*** 3.774*** 4.159***
(0.856) (0.884) (0.751) (0.883) (0.749) (0.741)
Rel. Ch. RH -0.00622*** -0.0113*** -0.0174** -0.0112*** -0.0174** -0.0178**
(0.00210) (0.00245) (0.00717) (0.00242) (0.00717) (0.00743)
Log Savings 1999 -0.0944*** -0.0845*** -0.0830***
(0.0311) (0.0314) (0.0313)
Log Wealth 1999 -0.0329 0.134*** 0.139***
(0.0525) (0.0185) (0.0185)
Primary Labor Income 0.0131*** 0.0120*** 0.0121***
(0.00312) (0.00315) (0.00314)
2nd Decile Wealth -2.498***
(0.469)
3rd Decile Wealth -1.229***
(0.239)
4th Decile Wealth -0.490***
(0.152)
5th Decile Wealth -0.185*
(0.110)
6th Decile Wealth 0.0365
(0.0838)
7th Decile Wealth 0.0639
(0.0683)
8th Decile Wealth 0.117**
(0.0548)
9th Decile Wealth 0.122***
(0.0425)
Couple -0.0680 -0.0388 -0.0734 -0.00315 -0.0377
(0.0508) (0.0511) (0.0498) (0.0503) (0.0491)
Single with Child -0.0372 -0.0491 -0.147 -0.0750 -0.171
(0.219) (0.215) (0.216) (0.214) (0.215)
Couple with Child -0.156** -0.131** -0.193*** -0.0961 -0.159***
(0.0607) (0.0610) (0.0587) (0.0605) (0.0582)
Nr Children< 18 -0.0855*** -0.0793*** -0.0810*** -0.0840*** -0.0854***
(0.0242) (0.0244) (0.0236) (0.0243) (0.0236)
Nr Household Members 0.103*** 0.0999*** 0.111*** 0.103*** 0.115***
(0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0174) (0.0177) (0.0173)
Constant -0.854 -2.692*** -1.464*** -2.028*** -0.737* -0.0559***
(0.785) (0.464) (0.456) (0.434) (0.418) (0.0133)
Observations 12261 12261 13885 12261 13885 13885
R-squared 0.036 0.022 0.018 0.021 0.017 0.006
Note: Dependent variable is relative change in the share of financial wealth between 1999-2004. IV-estimates
using instrumented tax rates. Splines are linear decile spline terms over the wealth distribution. Primary
labor income is a term containing the log of the sum of primary labor income earned between 1999-2004. Age
dummies for the primary earner were included in the regression ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
28
Table 12: Long-Run Effects on Wealth Accumulation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV-IV IV-IV IV-IV IV-IV IV-IV IV-IV
Rel. Ch. R 3.031*** 2.775*** 4.256*** 2.808*** 4.257*** 4.318***
(0.431) (0.353) (0.429) (0.355) (0.429) (0.432)
Savings 1999 -0.0959*** -0.0957*** -0.0941***
(0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0121)
Wealth 1999 -0.210*** -0.263*** -0.257***
(0.0273) (0.00977) (0.00971)
Primary Labor Income 0.00845*** 0.00898*** 0.00240*
(0.00118) (0.00120) (0.00125)
2nd Decile Wealth -1.252**
(0.590)
3rd Decile Wealth 0.122
(0.127)
4th Decile Wealth 0.240***
(0.0739)
5th Decile Wealth 0.0846*
(0.0505)
6th Decile Wealth 0.0113
(0.0386)
7th Decile Wealth -0.0181
(0.0306)
8th Decile Wealth -0.0207
(0.0237)
9th Decile Wealth -0.00274
(0.0169)
Couple -0.0241 -0.0329* 0.00254 -0.00631 0.00956
(0.0181) (0.0184) (0.0200) (0.0182) (0.0199)
Single with Child 0.0657 0.0676 0.0954* 0.0482 0.0900*
(0.0514) (0.0521) (0.0546) (0.0512) (0.0545)
Couple with Child -0.0362* -0.0427* 0.0228 -0.0166 0.0295
(0.0218) (0.0220) (0.0241) (0.0219) (0.0240)
Nr Children< 18 -0.0362*** -0.0389*** -0.0388*** -0.0424*** -0.0398***
(0.00842) (0.00852) (0.00898) (0.00848) (0.00893)
Nr Household Members 0.0415*** 0.0421*** 0.0255*** 0.0446*** 0.0263***
(0.00621) (0.00628) (0.00662) (0.00622) (0.00657)
Constant 2.255*** 2.838*** 0.271* 3.320*** 0.416*** 0.491***
(0.388) (0.203) (0.158) (0.200) (0.142) (0.00852)
Observations 12261 12261 12261 12261 12261 12261
R-squared 0.356 0.343 0.230 0.340 0.230 0.218
Note: Dependent variable is relative change in wealth between 1999-2004. IV-estimates using instrumented tax
rates and portfolio shares. Splines are linear decile spline terms over the wealth distribution. Primary labor income
is a term containing the log of the sum of primary labor income earned between 1999-2004. Age dummies for the
primary earner were included in the estimation. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 13: Short-Run Effects on Portfolio Composition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
¡65 wtax Singles Incl. outliers
Rel. Ch. R 2.722*** 11.51*** 9.826*** 2.739***
(0.406) (0.456) (1.029) (0.407)
Savings 1999 -0.0922*** -0.143*** -0.0723** -0.0917***
(0.0100) (0.0161) (0.0289) (0.00996)
Wealth 1999 -0.199*** -0.161*** -0.224*** -0.187***
(0.0216) (0.0187) (0.0713) (0.0194)
Primary Labour Income 0.00941*** 0.00416** 0.0133** 0.00901***
(0.00218) (0.00192) (0.00636) (0.00194)
1st Decile Wealth 1999 -3.806*** -19.24*** -3.776***
(0.877) (2.263) (0.882)
2nd Decile Wealth -1.135** -4.360*** -1.098**
(0.483) (0.760) (0.485)
3rd Decile Wealth 0.0498 -0.741** 0.0860
(0.115) (0.368) (0.112)
4th Decile Wealth 0.193*** -0.00663 0.222***
(0.0584) (0.189) (0.0547)
5th Decile Wealth 0.0770* 0.143 0.0979***
(0.0398) (0.142) (0.0364)
6th Decile Wealth -0.0186 -0.0744** 0.0246 -0.00346
(0.0307) (0.0305) (0.107) (0.0281)
7th Decile Wealth -0.0541** -0.0583*** -0.0269 -0.0426*
(0.0243) (0.0217) (0.0874) (0.0224)
8th Decile Wealth -0.0399** -0.0254 0.0167 -0.0299*
(0.0193) (0.0173) (0.0727) (0.0179)
9th Decile Wealth -0.0201 -0.00846 -0.0148 -0.0171
(0.0138) (0.0124) (0.0541) (0.0131)
Couple 0.0183 0.0140 0.0147
(0.0161) (0.0157) (0.0157)
Single with Child 0.0449 0.0332 0.0380
(0.0392) (0.0476) (0.0389)
Couple with Child -0.0336* -0.0290 -0.0364*
(0.0190) (0.0185) (0.0188)
Nr Children< 18 -0.0321*** -0.0283*** -0.0318***
(0.00704) (0.00698) (0.00701)
Nr Household Members 0.0433*** 0.0406*** 0.169*** 0.0431***
(0.00544) (0.00534) (0.0237) (0.00539)
Constant 2.250*** 1.919*** 1.990* 2.114***
(0.309) (0.270) (1.020) (0.283)
Observations 15144 10729 1001 15487
R-squared 0.347 0.270 0.593 0.346
Note: Dependent variable is relative change in the share of financial wealth between
1999-2001. IV-estimates using instrumented tax rates. Splines are linear decile
spline terms over the wealth distribution. Primary labor income is a term containing
the log of the sum of primary labor income earned between 1999-2001. Age dummies
for the primary earner were included in the regression ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p <
0.1.
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Table 14: Short-Run Effects on Wealth Accumulation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV-IV IV-IV IV-IV IV-IV IV-IV IV-IV
Rel. Ch. R 2.739*** 3.491*** 3.491*** 2.365*** 3.491*** 3.548***
(0.407) (0.366) (0.366) (0.305) (0.366) (0.368)
Savings 1999 -0.0917*** -0.0895***
(0.00996) (0.00989)
Wealth 1999 -0.187*** -0.239***
(0.0194) (0.00854)
Primary Labour Income 0.00901*** 0.000427
(0.00194) (0.00202)
1st Decile Wealth 1999 -3.776***
(0.882)
2nd Decile Wealth -1.098**
(0.485)
3rd Decile Wealth 0.0860
(0.112)
4th Decile Wealth 0.222***
(0.0547)
5th Decile Wealth 0.0979***
(0.0364)
6th Decile Wealth -0.00346
(0.0281)
7th Decile Wealth -0.0426*
(0.0224)
8th Decile Wealth -0.0299*
(0.0179)
9th Decile Wealth -0.0171
(0.0131)
Couple 0.0147 0.0428** 0.0423** 0.0251 0.0428**
(0.0157) (0.0178) (0.0180) (0.0162) (0.0178)
Single with Child 0.0380 0.0868** 0.0872** 0.0450 0.0868**
(0.0389) (0.0431) (0.0431) (0.0396) (0.0431)
Couple with Child -0.0364* 0.0126 0.0120 -0.0282 0.0126
(0.0188) (0.0214) (0.0215) (0.0194) (0.0214)
Nr Children< 18 -0.0318*** -0.0266*** -0.0264*** -0.0372*** -0.0266***
(0.00701) (0.00753) (0.00757) (0.00710) (0.00753)
Nr Household Members 0.0431*** 0.0235*** 0.0234*** 0.0466*** 0.0235***
(0.00539) (0.00566) (0.00573) (0.00539) (0.00566)
Constant 2.114*** 0.228* 0.215 2.980*** 0.228* 0.326***
(0.283) (0.135) (0.148) (0.167) (0.135) (0.00705)
Observations 15487 15487 15487 15487 15487 15487
R-squared 0.346 0.222 0.222 0.326 0.222 0.211
Note: Dependent variable is relative change in wealth between 1999-2004. IV-estimates using instrumented
tax rates and portfolio shares. Splines are linear decile spline terms over the wealth distribution. Primary
labor income is a term containing the log of the sum of primary labor income earned between 1999-2001. Age
dummies for the age of the primary earner were included in the estimation ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 15: Long-Run Effects on Portfolio Composition for Different Specifica-
tions and Subsamples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
¡65 wtax Singles Incl. outliers
Rel. Ch. RF 2.786*** 3.941*** 6.438** 0.255***
(0.865) (1.102) (3.168) (0.0582)
Rel. Ch. RH -0.00621*** -7.343*** -2.843** -0.00613***
(0.00209) (1.730) (1.251) (0.00157)
Log Savings 1999 -0.0964*** -0.187*** 0.135 -0.0823**
(0.0316) (0.0452) (0.116) (0.0321)
Log Wealth 1999 -0.0304 -0.159*** 0.0221 -0.0195
(0.0584) (0.0488) (0.161) (0.0538)
Primary Labour Income 0.0124*** 0.0172*** 0.00885 0.0139***
(0.00365) (0.00325) (0.00950) (0.00315)
1st Decile Wealth 1999
0
2nd Decile Wealth -2.494*** -2.157***
(0.482) (0.465)
3rd Decile Wealth -1.228*** 0.354 -1.192***
(0.253) (0.694) (0.241)
4th Decile Wealth -0.492*** 0.428 -0.408***
(0.165) (0.476) (0.155)
5th Decile Wealth -0.188 0.274 -0.124
(0.119) (0.372) (0.112)
6th Decile Wealth 0.0341 -0.0563 0.497* 0.0625
(0.0911) (0.0981) (0.296) (0.0852)
7th Decile Wealth 0.0623 -0.0338 0.335 0.0920
(0.0739) (0.0664) (0.236) (0.0694)
8th Decile Wealth 0.112* 0.0306 0.287 0.125**
(0.0588) (0.0532) (0.200) (0.0556)
9th Decile Wealth 0.117*** 0.0561 0.415*** 0.134***
(0.0450) (0.0418) (0.158) (0.0429)
Couple -0.0857* 0.0137 -0.0640
(0.0519) (0.0527) (0.0518)
Single with Child -0.0527 -0.151 -0.0692
(0.219) (0.310) (0.215)
Couple with Child -0.170*** -0.0544 -0.146**
(0.0614) (0.0637) (0.0620)
Nr Children< 18 -0.0881*** -0.0647** -0.0813***
(0.0244) (0.0253) (0.0245)
Nr Household Members 0.105*** 0.0884*** 0.0622 0.0984***
(0.0178) (0.0175) (0.0773) (0.0177)
Constant -0.829 0.343 -3.569 -0.930
(0.858) (0.795) (2.421) (0.789)
Observations 11903 8625 664 12510
R-squared 0.035 0.061 0.157 0.038
Note: Dependent variable is relative change in the share of financial wealth be-
tween 1999-2004. IV-estimates using instrumented tax rates. Splines are linear
decile spline terms over the wealth distribution. Primary labor income is a term
containing the log of the sum of primary labor income earned between 1999-2004.
Age dummies for age of the primary earner were included in the estimation. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 16: Long-Run Effects on Wealth Accumulation for Different Specifications and Sub-
samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
¡65 wtax Singles Incl. outliers IV-OLS
Rel. Ch. R 3.008*** 9.915*** 7.822*** 3.031*** 1.091***
(0.430) (0.471) (1.012) (0.431) (0.257)
Savings 1999 -0.0967*** -0.136*** -0.0676 -0.0959*** -0.115***
(0.0122) (0.0204) (0.0417) (0.0121) (0.0122)
Wealth 1999 -0.215*** -0.191*** -0.225*** -0.210*** -0.418***
(0.0306) (0.0304) (0.0812) (0.0273) (0.0302)
Primary Labour Income 0.00954*** 0.00470*** 0.0114*** 0.00845*** 0.0108***
(0.00139) (0.00119) (0.00398) (0.00118) (0.00129)
1st Decile Wealth 1999 2.099***
(0.227)
2nd Decile Wealth -1.247** -1.252** 1.299***
(0.588) (0.590) (0.171)
3rd Decile Wealth 0.117 -0.282 0.122 0.435***
(0.134) (0.353) (0.127) (0.117)
4th Decile Wealth 0.235*** 0.0739 0.240*** -0.0131
(0.0803) (0.211) (0.0739) (0.0800)
5th Decile Wealth 0.0806 0.0640 0.0846* -0.238***
(0.0559) (0.153) (0.0505) (0.0566)
6th Decile Wealth 0.00800 -0.0899** 0.00524 0.0113 -0.262***
(0.0427) (0.0439) (0.122) (0.0386) (0.0431)
7th Decile Wealth -0.0214 -0.0451 -0.0149 -0.0181 -0.235***
(0.0337) (0.0337) (0.0978) (0.0306) (0.0340)
8th Decile Wealth -0.0224 -0.0234 0.0655 -0.0207 -0.186***
(0.0259) (0.0257) (0.0813) (0.0237) (0.0263)
9th Decile Wealth -0.00187 -0.00300 0.0153 -0.00274 -0.107***
(0.0181) (0.0177) (0.0644) (0.0169) (0.0184)
Couple -0.0256 -0.0167 -0.0241 -0.0695***
(0.0188) (0.0197) (0.0181) (0.0206)
Single with Child 0.0691 0.0611 0.0657 0.0224
(0.0516) (0.0659) (0.0514) (0.0614)
Couple with Child -0.0390* -0.0523** -0.0362* -0.0886***
(0.0222) (0.0238) (0.0218) (0.0242)
Nr Children< 18 -0.0359*** -0.0223** -0.0362*** -0.0460***
(0.00849) (0.00895) (0.00842) (0.00925)
Nr Household Members 0.0416*** 0.0410*** 0.166*** 0.0415*** 0.0536***
(0.00631) (0.00652) (0.0290) (0.00621) (0.00684)
Constant 2.241*** 2.511*** 1.700 2.255*** 4.683***
(0.428) (0.423) (1.076) (0.388) (0.437)
Observations 11903 8625 664 12261 12831
R-squared 0.356 0.250 0.558 0.356 0.613
Note: Dependent variable is relative change in wealth between 1999-2004. IV-estimates using
instrumented tax rates and portfolio shares except in final column which only uses instrumented
tax rates. Splines are linear decile spline terms over the wealth distribution. Primary labor income
is a term containing the log of the sum of primary labor income earned between 1999-2004. Age
dummies for the age of the primary earner were included in the estimation. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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